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1 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
2 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2014),
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacy
datasecurityupdate_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/U73Q-PF9Q].
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
4 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809.
6 See, e.g., The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, U.S. DEP’T DEF., http://
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INTRODUCTION
“Tell me about U.S. cybersecurity law,” a British colleague
requested at a recent conference. It seemed like an easy question,
but it wasn’t. I paused for far too long to think about it.
That’s because there isn’t a single U.S. law that
comprehensively addresses cybersecurity. The Federal Trade
Commission Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce,”1 and the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) uses that law to penalize companies with inadequate
data security protections.2 Every state has a similar law, and
most states also have passed laws that require companies to
notify customers and regulators after data breaches. But those
are narrow, punitive rules that deal with data breaches after the
fact and don’t really focus on cybersecurity as a whole.
We have a number of statutes that focus on consumer
information, including: the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act,3 which regulates the collection of information from minors
under thirteen; the Video Privacy Protection Act,4 which restricts
the sharing of consumers’ video viewing information; and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,5 which governs the disclosure of
financial account data. But these statutes regulate privacy, not
cybersecurity.
The military has released a cyber strategy which is
compromised of quite a few cyber-defense missions,6 but those
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www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0415_Cyber-Strategy [http://perma.cc/S7AT-GT47].
7 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BLUEPRINT FOR A CYBER FUTURE: THE CYBER
SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE (2011), www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/nppd/blueprint-for-a-secure-cyber-future.pdf [http://perma.cc/GH9Y-V76Z].
8 See Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., http://www.nist.gov/
cyberframework/ [http://perma.cc/7K8W-J6CF] (last updated Dec. 11, 2015).
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apply only to military operations. The Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) also has a strategy comprised of a number of
goals and objectives,7 but those primarily involve government
infrastructure. The National Institute of Standards and
Technologies has released helpful guidelines,8 but those are, of
course, only guidelines and do not have the binding force of law.
After pausing for far too long, I said, “We don’t really have
any cybersecurity laws.” What we have, instead, is a patchwork
of related laws, including breach notification and privacy
statutes, that focus on penalizing companies for inadequate data
security. But our legal system lacks a coordinated network of
laws that are designed to promote cybersecurity and prevent
data breaches from occurring in the first place.
This Article seeks to address this shortfall by articulating a
consistent system of laws that would promote cybersecurity.
Part I of the Article defines cybersecurity from a legal
standpoint, and distinguishes it from concepts such as privacy
and data security. Many laws that purport to encourage
cybersecurity are, in fact, designed with a focus on protecting
privacy or encouraging data security. Unlike privacy and data
security, cybersecurity is focused not only on the information, but
the entire system and network. For this reason, laws that focus
only on privacy and data security may not consider all factors
necessary to promote cybersecurity. By clearly defining the term,
I hope to provide policymakers with clarity as they develop laws
aimed at promoting cybersecurity.
Part II examines the patchwork of state and federal privacy
and data security laws that are most commonly associated with
cybersecurity, including data breach notification laws and data
security requirements. These requirements have been the bedrock
of U.S. cybersecurity law, yet they are ineffective at preventing
cybersecurity incidents. For instance, companies that have
experienced a data breach must devote significant resources to
determining whether—and how—to satisfy the various notification
requirements. This Article evaluates the efficacy of such a
system, based on available data about cybersecurity incidents,
and concludes that the current legal system contains a number of
gaps that do not adequately address cybersecurity threats.
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I. WHAT IS CYBERSECURITY?
A logical starting point for our discussion is a definition of
cybersecurity. Although the term is commonly used by the press
and policymakers, its precise scope often varies.
In the private sector, cybersecurity often is associated with
data breaches. Indeed, a large portion of the cybersecurity
industry is dedicated to helping companies prevent data breaches
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Part III of the Article draws from other areas of law to
suggest a unitary framework that could provide strong, clear, and
adaptable cybersecurity laws and policies. Frist, policymakers
should consider centralizing cybersecurity responsibilities within
a single federal agency, rather than scattering them among the
FTC, fifty state attorneys general offices, and other agencies.
Such a structure would allow specialized employees and leaders
to shape the nation’s cybersecurity defense system. Second,
policymakers should reconsider the current system’s focus on
punitive measures, such as fining companies for failing to
adequately notify customers of data breaches. While penalties
always will be a necessary component of a cybersecurity law, our
laws also should include incentives for companies to invest in
costly cybersecurity protections. Among the policies that
lawmakers might consider are tax credits for cybersecurity
investments, a national cybersecurity insurance program, and a
safe harbor from data security lawsuits for companies that
adhere to a rigorous set of government-mandated security
standards. This Article considers the theories that support
including incentives, rather than only penalties, in a policy
framework. It will also examine how the government has used
such incentives in other areas, and how these incentives might
advance cybersecurity goals.
I refer to this concept as “positive cybersecurity law”—policies
designed to encourage cybersecurity before a malicious attack
occurs. This requires a shift in thinking from our nation’s
longstanding mindset in which nearly all cybersecurity laws are
punitive. While such regulations always play a role in
cybersecurity, our system should be a mix of punitive and
positive law. The unique design of cyberspace—interconnected
networks of public and private infrastructure—demands a
collaborative, rather than adversarial, relationship between the
government and industry. A combination of “carrots” and “sticks”
would most effectively encourage investments in cybersecurity.
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9 Tara Seals, Cybersecurity Spending to Hit $170Bn by 2020, INFOSECURITY MAG.
(July 13, 2015), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cybersecurity-spending-tohit/ [http://perma.cc/WJQ4-FZ59].
10 See Chad Perrin, The CIA Triad, TECHREPUBLIC (June 30, 2008, 8:13 AM),
www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/the-cia-triad/ [http://perma.cc/8923-QKKT].
11 See Dan Roberts, Obama Imposes New Sanctions Against North Korea in Response
to Sony Hack, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2015/jan/02/obama-imposes-sanctions-north-korea-sony-hack-the-interview [http://perma.cc/
6WXC-PRGX].
12 NICCS is a resources of cybersecurity information managed by DHS.
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and remediate the harm after a breach has occurred. Worldwide,
the cybersecurity industry was estimated to generate $75.4
billion in 2015.9 Companies are understandably concerned about
the exposure of their customers’ and employees’ personal
information, both because of potential legal liability and damage
to their brand. Moreover, data breaches may expose a company’s
trade secrets or other confidential business information that
could lead to significant financial harm to the company.
Accordingly, data security is an integral part of the cybersecurity
ecosystem.
However, data theft is only one aspect of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity professionals also help companies prevent the
destruction or inaccessibility of data. Moreover, cybersecurity
involves the protection of networks and systems from damage. In
other words, cybersecurity aims to safeguard the confidentiality,
integrity, and accessibility of data (commonly known as the
“CIA” triad).10
Cybersecurity involves the protection of both private and
public networks. Too often, policymakers and companies talk
about
“private-sector
cybersecurity”
and
“public-sector
cybersecurity.” The open architecture of the Internet makes it
futile to focus only on private-sector concerns, such as trade
secret theft, or only on public-sector concerns, such as
cyberattacks by other nation-states. For instance, North Korea’s
hack of Sony in 2014 implicated not only Sony’s business
interests and assets, but U.S. national security and international
relations, leading President Obama to impose sanctions.11
Similarly, if a cyberattack were to target U.S. government
infrastructure, private companies likely would be affected.
Accordingly, policymakers must look at cybersecurity in both the
private and public sectors at the same time.
These goals are best reflected in the National Initiative for
Cybersecurity Careers and Studies’ (“NICCS”)12 definition of
cybersecurity as “[t]he activity or process, ability or capability, or
state whereby information and communications systems and the
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13 Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology, NAT’L INITIATIVE
CYBERSECURITY CAREERS & STUD., www.niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary [http://perma.cc/Z2CL33K3].
14 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
15 Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1888)).
16 Id. at 193.
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information contained therein are protected from and/or
defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or
exploitation.”13 Under this definition, cybersecurity involves the
protection of both data and systems. The definition also does not
apply separate standards for public and private systems. The
NICCS definition serves as a useful starting point as we
determine how to meet the goals of cybersecurity.
Importantly, cybersecurity and privacy are not one in the
same. The modern legal concept of privacy emerged in Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’ 1890 Harvard Law Review
article, The Right to Privacy.14 They defined privacy as “the right
‘to be let alone,’”15 reasoning that common law right to property
“has grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as
well as tangible.”16 Privacy, therefore, involves individuals’
ability to control their personal data. Strong, proactive
cybersecurity measures help to promote privacy by reducing the
likelihood of unauthorized disclosure. However, there are a
number of other avenues in which privacy can be protected, such
as by providing individuals with choice about the collection and
sharing of their data. Unfortunately, cybersecurity and privacy
often are used interchangeably, leading some to the mistaken
belief that privacy-focused laws also will promote cybersecurity.
Why does the definition matter? If our goal is to promote
cybersecurity, we should have a clear idea of what exactly
cybersecurity is. As I will describe in Part II, many of our laws
that purport to promote cybersecurity do very little to accomplish
that goal. Some areas of cybersecurity could benefit from new
laws, but often those areas are entirely unaddressed in the
current political debate at the federal and state levels. To assess
whether our current laws advance the goals of cybersecurity,
using the NICCS definition, we must examine whether they
protect systems, networks, and data from damage, unauthorized
use or modification, or exploitation.
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CYBERSECURITY LAW
As discussed above, the United States does not have a
cohesive cybersecurity legal framework. Instead, it had a
patchwork of laws that address some aspects of data security.
These laws fail to work together harmoniously, occasionally
conflict, and do little to ensure the future security of data,
networks, and systems. The current legal system largely is
backward-looking, and provides companies and the public sector
little guidance as to how to prevent future cybersecurity
incidents.
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17 See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 22,
2015), www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/securitybreach-notification-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/U4RK-4DDE].
18 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29(g)(1)(D), 1798.82(h)(1)(D) (West 2016).
19 N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a)(5) (West 2016).
20 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (West 2016).
21 CIV. § 1798.82.
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A. Breach Notification Laws
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted
data breach notification laws since 2002.17 These laws require
companies and government agencies to notify individuals that
their personal information has been compromised. The laws vary
significantly in scope. For instance, most laws are triggered if the
individual’s name is compromised, along with a financial account
number, Social Security number, or driver’s license number.
However, some notification laws cover additional categories of
information, such as medical data18 and birth dates.19 Some
states only require notification if the company determines that
the disclosure poses a reasonable risk of harm to the
individuals,20 while other states require notification regardless of
the actual risk.21 The required content and form of breach notices
also vary by state. Breach notification laws apply to the state’s
residents, and most companies have customers in all fifty states.
Accordingly, if a company experiences a data breach, it must
devote significant time and staff to determining the states in
which it must notify residents and regulators, as well as the
timing, form, and substance of the notification. That time and
money could be better spent on measures to mitigate the harm of
the breach and to prevent future incidents from occurring.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the data breach notice
fulfills its intended purpose. Individuals are informed of data
breaches weeks or months after the initial exposure. By the time
that they receive the notice, identity theft and other damage
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B. FTC Data Security Enforcement and State Data Security Laws
Many people are surprised to learn that the United States
does not have a national law that sets specific data security
standards. Instead, the FTC uses its general consumer protection
regulatory authority to bring enforcement actions against
companies that it believes have failed to adequately safeguard
personal information. The FTC asserts this authority under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which allows the
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22 See Jeff Kosseff, Notified About a Data Breach? Too Late, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9,
2015, 7:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/notified-about-a-data-breach-too-late-144434
5445.
23 Elizabeth Weise, 43% of Companies Had a Data Breach in the Past Year, USA
TODAY (Sept. 24, 2014, 3:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/09/24/databreach-companies-60/16106197/ [http://perma.cc/U7AN-A2TL].
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likely already has occurred. The notices typically direct the
individuals to obtain free credit reports, and some companies
offer additional identity theft protection services. However, few
customers actually use these services when offered.22 Moreover,
the rationale for data breach notification laws is outdated. States
began passing data breach notification laws in 2002, when
large-scale data breaches were relatively uncommon. The size,
number, and scope of data breaches have increased exponentially
in recent years. In a 2014 survey of executives, the Ponemon
Institute found that 43% experienced a data breach in the past
year, up from 33% in a 2013 survey.23 Individuals should operate
under the assumption that their data has been breached;
therefore, they would be wise to take precautions such as
changing passwords, checking their free annual credit reports,
and routinely updating their computer anti-virus software and
operating systems. Although data breaches may have been rare a
decade ago when the breach notice laws were first enacted,
breaches now are commonplace.
Although there is some value in notifying individuals of data
breaches, this should not be the primary focus of cybersecurity
law. Once a data breach has occurred, much of the harm is
inevitable, regardless of whether customers have been notified. It
would be far more productive if companies were able to devote all
of their time and expertise to forensics: figuring out how the
breach occurred, and how to prevent it from occurring again.
Unfortunately, our cybersecurity legal framework focuses
heavily on breach notification laws. This is an outdated and
increasingly futile exercise that adds unnecessary expense and
slows companies’ ability to respond to data breaches.
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FTC to prevent companies from using “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”24 Often, the FTC alleges that
a company’s lax data security practices constitute “unfair” trade
practices.
For decades, there has been confusion as to what makes a
trade practice “unfair.” In 1964, the FTC issued guidance in
which it stated that the following factors determine whether a
trade practice was unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words,
it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or
other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).25
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Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964).
26 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
27 See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43723, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION’S REGULATION OF DATA SECURITY UNDER ITS UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR
PRACTICES AUTHORITY 6 (2014).
28 See PATRICIA BAILIN, IAPP, STUDY: WHAT FTC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TEACH US
ABOUT THE FEATURES OF REASONABLE PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY PRACTICES,
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/FTC-WhitePaper_V4.pdf [http://perma.cc/8VW
V-85N7].
24
25
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Over the next two decades, critics questioned whether the
FTC is in the best position to determine whether trade practices
are “immoral” or “unscrupulous,” leading the FTC to gradually
change its analysis to focus on the harm and benefits to
customers. Congress codified this new approach in 1994,
amending the Federal Trade Commission Act to define “unfair”
as a practice that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.”26
The FTC also has alleged that security practices that violate
companies’ privacy policies constitute deceptive trade practices
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Between 2002 and
2014, the FTC brought more than fifty cases against companies
whose security and privacy practices, it claimed, were unfair or
deceptive.27 Typically, companies settle these enforcement
actions before they go to court, agreeing to a consent order that,
among other things, allows the FTC to closely oversee the
companies’ data security practices.28
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FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
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Because section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does
not explicitly mention data security, some critics have asserted
that the FTC lacks jurisdiction to bring data security
enforcement actions. Among the most vocal opponents of such
actions is Wyndham Worldwide Resorts, which was hacked in
2008 and 2009.29 After investigating the attacks, the FTC
brought an enforcement action against Wyndham, alleging that
Wyndham’s data security measures were inadequate and,
therefore, unfair, and that the company deceived customers by
failing to provide the security measures that it guaranteed in its
privacy policy.30 Among the practices that the FTC found most
objectionable was the storage of credit card information in clear
text, the lack of a requirement for complex passwords on
Wyndham’s computer systems, and Wyndham’s failure to use
firewalls and other common data security solutions.31
Unlike most companies that face an FTC data security
enforcement action, Wyndham did not settle with the FTC.
Instead, the FTC brought a civil action against Wyndham in the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.32 Wyndham
moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Federal Trade
Commission Act does not give the FTC the authority to regulate
data security.33 Wyndham noted that Congress has passed
statutes that provide the FTC with the authority to regulate
cybersecurity in particular areas, including financial institutions,
websites that collect information from children under thirteen,
and credit agencies. Accordingly, Wyndham argued, such
“tailored grants of substantive authority to the FTC in the
cybersecurity field would be inexplicable if the Commission
already had general substantive authority over this field.”34 The
district court rejected this argument, and on appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed. The court reasoned
that all of those tailored laws served different purposes than the
general Federal Trade Commission Act, and therefore, “none of
the recent privacy legislation was ‘inexplicable’ if the FTC
already had some authority to regulate corporate cybersecurity
through § 45(a).”35 The Third Circuit also rejected Wyndham’s
argument that the FTC’s numerous attempts to convince
Congress to enact laws that provide it with specific data
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protection powers demonstrates that section 5 does not provide it
with such authority.
Wyndham also argued that the FTC failed to provide clear
data security standards with “ascertainable certainty,”36 in
violation of the Due Process Clause. The court also rejected this
argument, concluding that Wyndham was not entitled to
ascertainable certainty. Instead, the court concluded, “the
relevant question in this appeal is whether Wyndham had fair
notice that its conduct could fall within the meaning of the
statute.”37 Wyndham, the court wrote, is “only entitled to notice
of the meaning of the statute and not to the agency’s
interpretation of the statute.”38
The Wyndham case is important because it demonstrates
two primary flaws with the FTC’s data security enforcement.
First, Wyndham raised valid questions about whether section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides the FTC with
authority to regulate data security. The Third Circuit is the only
federal appellate court to rule on the issue, so there is a very real
chance that another circuit would disagree, creating a circuit
split that ultimately would be resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Second, and more importantly, Wyndham demonstrated
that the FTC provides little concrete guidance as to what
constitutes adequate data security. This is perhaps the most
significant shortcoming with the FTC’s current data security
enforcement system. Even if a company is well-intentioned and
attempts to comply with all applicable data security laws, it has
no guarantee that the FTC would believe that its efforts are
adequate. What kinds of data should be encrypted in transit and
at rest? What level of encryption should a company use? How
often should companies require employees to reset passwords?
How long should passwords be? Should a company use two-factor
authentication for remote access? What about in-office access?
How often should companies provide cybersecurity training to
employees? Should a company design an incident response plan?
These are just some of the many questions that companies have
on a routine basis. Binding, concrete guidance on these issues
would be incredibly helpful, and likely would increase the overall
number of cybersecurity measures that companies put in place. If
a company knows that a cybersecurity safeguard will help to
satisfy regulators’ expectations, the investments in that
safeguard will be easier to justify.
Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 255.
Id.
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Approximately a dozen states have supplemented the FTC’s
general data security enforcement with laws that impose data
security requirements on companies that process the data of the
state’s residents.39 However, most of these laws simply require a
company to develop “reasonable” security, providing no more
certainty than the FTC. The two exceptions are Nevada, which
requires compliance with payment card industry data security
standards, and Massachusetts, which requires companies to
develop detailed data security plans in writing.40 However, these
state-level laws do little to address the significant uncertainty
that arises due to the lack of nationwide, concrete standards for
data security. Furthermore, if other states follow their lead and
enact their own specific data security regulations, companies
would be forced to apply a number of different data security
standards, based on the state in which the individual lives. Why
should, say, the personal data of a Massachusetts resident
receive more protection than the data of a New Hampshire
resident? Cybersecurity simply is not an area where state-level
regulation is effective.
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39 Hogan Lovells, Outlook for State Data Security Laws: More than Breach
Notification, IAPP (Dec. 16, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/outlook-for-state-data-securitylaws-more-than-breach-notification [http://perma.cc/2VX5-FJJ3].
40 Id.
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III. A POSITIVE, UNITARY FRAMEWORK
Now that we have a better idea of the concepts that are
involved in cybersecurity and the shortcomings of the current
legal framework, we can begin to create a legal framework that
provides companies with the certainty necessary to invest heavily
in cybersecurity.
Cyberspace, by its very architecture, is a network of both
private-sector and public-sector infrastructure. Unlike traditional
regulatory areas, such as food safety, where the government is
more than an overseer of the private sector, the government is a
partner with the private sector. The government developed the
initial infrastructure of the Internet, and the private sector
invested billions of dollars to build that initial infrastructure into
the transformative force that it is today. Accordingly, unlike
other areas, in which traditional top-down regulation is effective,
cybersecurity requires a different mindset. Cybersecurity
requires a continuation of the partnership between the
government and companies. Indeed, an insecure Internet harms
the private sector by slowing the growth and progress of the
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Internet; it is in the best interests of every company to work with
the government for a more secure cyberspace.
In line with that collaborative mindset, below are four
suggested starting points for building such a legal framework. I
note that I do not address whether Congress should immunize
companies from liability arising from sharing cyberthreat
information with the federal government. Such proposals are
subject to significant debate among policymakers, companies,
and privacy advocates. The goal of this Article is to highlight
policies that have not received as much public attention and debate.
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A. Create a Safe Harbor for Responsible Cybersecurity
As I argued in the previous section, the FTC’s current data
security enforcement provides little certainty for well-intentioned
companies that would like to comply with all legal requirements.
Ideally, the FTC would issue specific regulations that set
minimum standards such as password lengths, firewall
capabilities, and categories of data that require encryption in
transit and at rest.
A likely response to such a proposal is that every data
security incident involves unique circumstances, and therefore, it
is impossible to provide minimum standards that apply in all
circumstances. For instance, costly firewalls may be more
necessary for companies that handle sensitive information, such
as health records, and may be more affordable for larger
companies than for smaller companies. Moreover, larger
companies are more likely to be able to afford dedicated
information security staff.
Point taken. It would be difficult to proscribe nationwide,
minimum data security standards for all companies. Such rules
could lead to unreasonable penalties for small companies, or
those that do not typically process significant amounts of
personal information and, therefore, are not in a position to make
significant investments.
Instead of setting a national minimum cybersecurity
standard, Congress should pass a law that directs the FTC to
develop cybersecurity criteria for a national safe harbor program.
If a company demonstrates, through an annual independent
audit, that it has satisfied all of those safe harbor criteria, then it
cannot be the subject of a regulatory action or lawsuit—at either
the federal or state level—arising from a data breach or another
cybersecurity incident, unless the regulator or plaintiff can
demonstrate that the breach was due to the company’s
intentional actions or gross negligence.
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A safe harbor program would provide companies with
significant incentive to make costly investments in cybersecurity
hardware, software, and staff. Although companies would not be
required to make these investments, doing so would provide
them with reasonable certainty that they would be protected
from lawsuits and regulatory actions.
In fact, this would not be the first technology-related safe
harbor. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) addresses
concerns about online copyright piracy by granting Internet service
providers and websites with immunity for copyright infringement
claims arising from their users’ actions, contingent upon the
providers removing the infringing content upon receiving notice.41
The DMCA safe harbor affords service providers with a
significant incentive to remove infringing content.
Critics likely would argue that the safe harbor would
unfairly shield companies from being held responsible for data
breaches that are caused by their inadequate security. Such
criticism would fail for two reasons. First, companies still could
face regulatory actions and lawsuits if they are found to have
been grossly negligent. The safe harbor would not provide an
absolute shield; rather, it would provide companies with qualified
protection in exchange for upfront investments in cybersecurity.
Even if a company has qualified for the safe harbor, significant
lapses could lead to its being held responsible in court or before a
regulatory agency.
Second, the statute should direct the FTC to set very high
standards for companies to qualify for the safe harbor. These
should not be the minimum necessary safeguards for
cybersecurity; instead, the safe harbor should only reward
companies that invest in and implement the best of the best
cybersecurity safeguards, as determined by the FTC. The safe
harbor requirements should be designed to be difficult to achieve;
qualified protection from lawsuits and regulatory actions is
incredibly valuable, and companies should be required to meet a
very high bar before receiving that protection.
The failure of a number of technology-related laws is that
they do not quickly adapt to new changes in technology. For
instance, Congress took years to update the Video Privacy
Protection Act, which restricts the disclosure of video rental
information, to address online streaming video services such as
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Netflix.42 Congress often takes years to pass Legislation; by the
time that a technology-related bill has been enacted, there is a
good chance that it will be outdated. For that reason, the FTC—
and not Congress—should set specific safe harbor requirements
in regulations, and routinely update those requirements. The
FTC is better positioned than Congress to set these requirements
because it has more technical expertise, and promulgating
regulations typically takes less time than passing a new statute.
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42 Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–258, 126
Stat. 2414 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)).
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B. Create a Nationwide Breach Notification Standard
As described in Part II of this Article, I question the utility of
data breach notifications. Complying with the specific notification
rules of forty-seven states and the District of Columbia is
time-consuming, and there is no demonstrable evidence that
notifications actually mitigate the harm caused by data breaches.
However, eliminating breach notifications altogether likely would
face significant opposition from privacy advocacy groups.
Politically, such a change likely would be a non-starter.
As a compromise, Congress should pass a national data
breach notification law that preempts the state notification laws.
By creating a single standard, companies would no longer be
forced to analyze the dozens of different procedures and
definitions in the state laws. Individuals still would receive
notice of significant breaches, but the process would be far less
time-consuming for companies, allowing them to focus their time
and resources on preventing further damage from the breach.
The specific requirements of a national data breach
notification law likely would be subject to intense debate and
negotiation among companies and privacy advocates. Below are
the key elements that a national breach notification law should
address:
Risk of harm: Some state breach notification laws only
require companies to notify individuals if they determine that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the breach will lead to harm,
such as identity theft. Other state laws require notice in all
circumstances, even if there is no risk of harm. Ideally, a national
breach notice law would only require companies to notify
individuals if there is some risk of identity theft or other harm. If
there truly is not a risk of harm, it would be counterproductive to
notify and unnecessarily scare customers. Moreover, if customers
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receive too many breach notices, they will be less likely to take
the notices seriously.
Definition of “personal information”: Similarly, the
federal law should only apply to breaches of sensitive categories
of personal information. Social Security numbers, unencrypted
credit card numbers, and other information that could be used in
identity theft should fall within the scope of the law. However,
breaches that only disclose a name or email address likely do not
present significant risk.
Minimum number of affected individuals: A small
breach, involving only a few individuals, should not trigger a
nationwide breach notification. The federal breach law should
only apply if a minimum number of people—such as 500 or
1000—are affected.
Encryption: Like every state breach notice law, the federal
law should not apply if the information was encrypted.
Length of time: Companies should be required to notify
individuals of data breaches only after the companies have had
an opportunity to investigate the incident and fully remediate
the harm. A company’s first priority should be preventing further
breaches or damage.
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43 See generally Credits and Deductions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Credits-&Deductions [http://perma.cc/K9DP-PNCE] (last updated Feb. 1, 2016).
44 See TREASURY DEP’T, SUMMARY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON CYBERSECURITY
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C. Provide Tax Incentives for Cybersecurity
Very little public debate about cybersecurity has focused on
the use of tax incentives to promote investments. That should
change. The federal tax code offers tax incentives for education,
wind energy, electric vehicles, and other areas that the
government has determined to be a priority for investment.43 Yet
the tax code does not provide a penny in tax incentives for
investments in cybersecurity.
This is partly due to the nascence of the cybersecurity field.
The federal tax code received its last comprehensive overhaul in
1986, decades before cybersecurity emerged as a common term
and serious challenge. However, the failure also is due to fiscal
concerns. In response to an Executive Order directing
departments to analyze potential cybersecurity policies, the
Treasury Department wrote that tax incentives for cybersecurity
“would come at the expense of foregone revenue for the
government or reallocation of existing fiscal obligations,” and
recommended against further consideration of tax incentives.44

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 38 Side B

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

416

4/19/2016 5:48 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:2

D. Offer National Cybersecurity Insurance
After a data breach, companies often are surprised to learn
that their general commercial insurance policies may not cover
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INCENTIVES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636 (2013).
45 Atlantic Council / Zurich Insurance Report Finds the Global Benefits of Cyber
Connectivity Expected to Outweigh Costs by $160 Trillion Through 2030, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/atlantic-councilzurich-insurance-report-finds-the-global-benefits-of-cyber-connectivity-expected-to-out
weigh-costs-by-160-trillion-through-2030 [http://perma.cc/RE9P-KESC].
46 See Cybersecurity Investment Incentive Tax Credit (CIITC), MD. DEP’T COM., http://
commerce.maryland.gov/fund/programs-for-businesses/cyber-tax-credit [http://perma.cc/Q
HP9-VX4B].
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The Treasury Department is correct that, in the short term,
tax incentives may result in a reduction in revenues to the
federal government. However, such a view is short-sighted. If
structured properly, tax incentives could dramatically increase
companies’ investments in cybersecurity safeguards, preventing
costly data breaches and stimulating economic growth. Indeed, a
report by the Atlantic Council estimates that an insecure
Internet would reduce global economic net benefit by $90 trillion;
a fully secure Internet would lead to a net gain of $190 trillion.45
Cybersecurity tax incentives could be structured in a number
of different ways. The government could provide companies with
a tax credit for investments in qualified cybersecurity
expenditures up to a certain annual amount. The challenge for
policymakers will be agreement on which cybersecurity
investments qualify for the tax credit. An effective program
would broadly include hardware, software, services, and staffing
that help to promote the confidentiality, integrity, and
accessibility of systems, networks, and data, consistent with the
definition of “cybersecurity” in Part I of this Article.
Policymakers also would need to determine the maximum size of
cybersecurity tax credits. A $50,000 annual tax credit may
provide a significant incentive for a small business to invest in
cybersecurity, but that credit would be a rounding error for the
budget of a Fortune 500 company. Accordingly, the maximum tax
credit could be tied to an objective measure of a company’s size,
such as its annual revenues or number of employees.
Alternatively, the federal government could provide a tax
credit that encourages investments in cybersecurity companies.
This could be modeled after a Maryland program that provides a
33% tax credit for investments of up to $250,000 in certain
cybersecurity businesses.46 Such a program, at the national level,
likely would lead to an increase in cybersecurity innovation.
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the expenses involved with remediation and defending against
legal claims.47 Some insurers have developed cybersecurity
insurance policies that specifically insure companies for certain
cybersecurity events. So far, the policies have received lukewarm
reviews from companies and the cybersecurity community due to
the cost and the number of exclusions that apply if companies
have not implemented adequate safeguards.48 DHS has conducted
workshops and issued reports on the “nascent” cybersecurity
insurance market, and insurers told DHS that their
cybersecurity offerings are limited due to “a lack of actuarial
data; aggregation concerns; and the unknowable nature of all
potential cyber threat vectors.”49 These problems have placed
cybersecurity insurance out of reach for many companies. In a
2015 survey of small businesses, Endurance International Group
found that although 81% of small business owners are concerned
about cybersecurity, only 5% of the small businesses have
purchased cybersecurity insurance.50
This coverage gap provides an opportunity for policymakers
to give companies more protection from catastrophic data
breaches, while at the same time encouraging companies to
invest in cybersecurity safeguards. The solution is a modified
version of the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”).
Congress enacted the NFIP in 1968 to address concerns about
building homes on rivers and other floodplains. NFIP flood
insurance is available to property owners in communities that
have adopted minimum floodplain management regulations that
help to minimize the likelihood that a building would be
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47 See Paul F. Roberts, Cyber Insurance: Only Fools Rush in, ITWORLD (Oct.
27, 2014), http://www.itworld.com/article/2839393/cyber-insurance-only-fools-rush-in.html
[http://perma.cc/LUH2-PN6P] (“Insurers have responded by writing exclusions into
[commercial general liability] and other nuts and bolts commercial policies, like so-called
E&O (errors and omissions) and D&O (directors and officers) liability policies. Those
exclusions carve out cyber claims and push them into new, specialized insurance
products.”).
48 Don’t Waste Your Money on Cyber Breach Insurance, INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept.
26, 2012), http://www.darkreading.com/dont-waste-your-money-on-cyber-breach-insurance/
d/d-id/1138422 [http://perma.cc/7GMW-BFDR] (“If line-of-business and legal leaders
unilaterally decide to get a breach policy without input from IT, they may miss exclusions
in the policy that require a higher level of controls than what the organization currently
has in place.”).
49 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INSURANCE INDUSTRY WORKING SESSION READOUT
REPORT (2014).
50 New Survey Finds a Vast Majority of U.S. Small Business Owners Believe
Cybersecurity Is a Concern and Lawmakers Should Do More To Combat Cyber-Attacks,
ENDURANCE INT’L GRP. (May 4, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/newsurvey-finds-a-vast-majority-of-us-small-business-owners-believe-cybersecurity-is-a-concernand-lawmakers-should-do-more-to-combat-cyber-attacks-300076543.html [http://perma.cc/
39R5-94F6].
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damaged or destroyed in a flood.51 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency administers the NFIP and promulgates
regulations that set the minimum safeguards for local
communities that wish to participate in the program. As of 2014,
5.35 million NFIP policies are in force.52 In 2005, when
Hurricane Katrina hit the southern states, the NFIP paid $17.8
billion in loss dollars.53
NFIP serves as a roadmap for the solution to the
cybersecurity insurance problem. The government could create a
cybersecurity insurance program, structured similarly to the
NFIP. A government agency with experience in cybersecurity,
such as DHS, would administer the insurance program and
promulgate minimum cybersecurity safeguards that a company
must implement to qualify for the insurance. If implemented
properly, the program would help businesses mitigate risk, while
encouraging companies to invest in cybersecurity infrastructure
and services. Such a program would not only benefit businesses,
but it would be a net win for the American public, as the
cybersecurity safeguards would result in fewer cybersecurity
incidents.
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51 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FEMA 496, JOINING THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM (2005), http://www.floods.org/ace-files/documentlibrary/State_Local
%20Resources%20and%20Tools/3.6_FEMA_496_JoiningNFIP.pdf [http://perma.cc/AYP6U4SM].
52 Total Policies in Force by Calendar Year, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/totalpolicies-force-calendar-year [http://perma.cc/94SH-HN94] (last updated Nov. 19, 2015).
53 Loss Dollars Paid by Calendar Year, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/loss-dollarspaid-calendar-year [http://perma.cc/XH76-BGJH] (last updated Nov. 19, 2015).
54 See Jeff Kosseff, Analysis of White House Data Breach Notification Bill,
INSIDEPRIVACY (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.insideprivacy.com/uncategorized/analysis-ofwhite-house-data-breach-notification-bill/ [http://perma.cc/7FKA-9YXC].
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CONCLUSION
Some of the proposals in this Article, such as the national
data breach notification standard, have been discussed for many
years but have not gained significant traction.54 Other proposals,
such as the safe harbor and insurance program, have not been
discussed significantly, and may come out of left field for many
policymakers. This is because our cybersecurity debate has
focused too long on punitive measures rather than collaboration
between the private and public sectors.
Our cybersecurity policy is built on decades-old infrastructure
that does not account for the unique, public-private nature of
cyberspace. Regulating companies into oblivion is not the most
effective way to optimize investments in cybersecurity. Instead,
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we need a legal framework that encourages companies to work
with the government to invest in cybersecurity. Such a change
will benefit not only the companies, but society as a whole,
helping to secure individuals’ personal information.
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